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About inventory models, a concern is “often made [that] any resemblances between the models 
constructed and reality are purely coincidental.”  One set of factors not usually considered in 
textbook models of inventory decisions is suggested by well-documented evidence in 
macroeconomics, that the stock market affects investment decisions.  Does the stock market also 
affect inventory decisions, and how?  I study four hypotheses.  The first is that the market could 
be a side-show, with no impact on firms’ decisions.  The second is that the market influences 
inventory decisions via a financing channel.  When the market over-values firms, firms can get 
easier and cheaper financing, and tend to increase their inventory.  The third is a dissipation 
channel.  When the market over-values firms, firms are less disciplined and let inventories rise.  
The last is a catering channel.  When the market discounts high-inventory firms, firms decrease 
their inventory, and vice versa.  I report evidence that rejects the first, weakly supports the 
second and third, and strongly supports the fourth hypotheses.  This evidence contributes to an 
emerging area for empirical research, at the intersection of finance and operations management. 
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Inventory and the Stock Market 
1.1.  Introduction 
I study four hypotheses of how the stock market could affect firms’ inventory decisions.  The 
first is that the market could be a side-show (e.g., Morck, et al. (1990)), with no impact on firms’ 
decisions.  The second is that the market influences inventory decisions via a financing channel.  
When the market over-values firms, firms can get easier and cheaper financing, and tend to 
increase their inventory (e.g., Stein (1996) and Baker, et al. (2003) have similar stories for capital 
expenditure and dividend policies).  The third is a dissipation channel.  For example, when the 
market over-values firms, firms are less disciplined and let inventories rise, along the lines of 
Jensen (1986).  The last is a catering channel.  When the market discounts high-inventory firms, 
firms decrease their inventory.  When the market places a premium on inventory, firms increase 
their inventory (e.g., see Baker and Wurgler (2004) for catering to a dividend premium). 
The data shows that the stock market does not appear to be just a side-show.  That is, while firms 
make inventory decisions based on fundamentals such as operational and sales parameters, they 
also make these decisions with a view to the stock market.  I find weak evidence for the 
financing and dissipation channels, and strong evidence of catering. 
The evidence contributes to empirical research in what might be called “operations finance.” At 
this intersection of finance and operations management, a recent set of pioneering papers 
document how the stock market reacts to firms’ operational performance (e.g., Chen, et al. 
(2005); Gaur, et al. (2005); Hendricks and Singhal (2005)).  These papers have a parallel in one 
major theme of finance: asset pricing.  In this paper, I document the opposite, of how firms might 
manage operations with a view to the capital markets (see also Netessine and Roumiantsev 
(2005)).  This is in line with another major theme of finance: corporate finance.  As a clarifying 
note, I focus on the stock market rather than other capital markets (e.g., the debt market), 
because the former is the most prominent and because debt financing is related to stock market 
valuation, as I explain below.   2
1.2.  Inventory Decisions and the Stock Market 
The textbook model of inventory decision-making is based on fundamental parameters such as 
financing and holding costs.  Arrow, et al. (1951) provides an early exposition of this idea.  Such 
costs accurately reflect the risk and return of firms’ decisions.  One assumption is that firms 
make inventory decisions independent of the stock market, which is a source of financing and 
valuation information. 
This study is motivated by the growing body of evidence that the stock market is not efficient, 
which has implications for financing and valuation.  Inefficient markets could mis-value firms.  
The key ideas are that there are noise traders who hold beliefs (“sentiment”) that cannot be 
rationally justified, the activities of these traders do not cancel out, and there are limits to 
arbitraging away the uncancelled sentiment.  For this paper, I use the terms “inefficiency,” 
“sentiment,” and “mis-valuation” (over- or under-valuation) interchangeably.  Theoretical 
models show that inefficient markets can hold even if transactions are costless.  Shleifer (2000) 
provides an account of inefficient markets in finance, and Chen, et al. (2005) and Gaur, et al. 
(2005) suggest evidence of this in an operations context.  The body of theory and empirical 
evidence naturally leads to the question of whether and how inefficient stock markets affect real 
operational decisions. 
A hint of what is to come is that there is well-known empirical evidence at the macroeconomic 
level that the stock market explains changes in investments (e.g., Bosworth (1975), Blanchard, et 
al. (1990)).  And the most volatile of investment changes is in inventories (e.g., Kashyap, et al. 
(1994)).  Does the stock market also explain changes in inventories, and not just investments in 
general, and at the firm level, not just the macroeconomic level?  If so, how?  If the answers to 
these questions reveal that firms do time their inventories according to vagaries of the stock 
market, the resulting misallocation of resources over time is more severe than misallocation in a 
cross-section of firms.  As pointed out by Morck, et al. (1990), misallocation in a cross-section 
could at least be mitigated by the fact that overall inventory levels are approximately unaffected.  
Too little inventory in one department store might be compensated by more at another.     3
However, misallocation over time is irrevocably more damaging to the economy at large. 
Beyond this practical implication, the answers can also form the basis of a more empirically 
accurate model of how inventory decisions are made (e.g., Netessine and Roumiantsev (2005)).  
They help address the concern “often made [about inventory models, that] any resemblances 
between the models constructed and reality are purely coincidental” (Whitin (1952)). 
I build up the answers by testing four hypotheses.  The first is the baseline: the stock market is 
just a side-show, a term introduced by Morck, et al. (1990), who study the impact of the stock 
market on capital expenditures.  Under this hypothesis, the market does not explain inventory 
decisions beyond the fundamental parameters.  The earliest exposition of this idea is the Q theory 
expounded by Tobin (1969), where Q is a summary statistic for the stock market’s information 
about the firm’s fundamental investment opportunities.  For this paper, I adhere to the more 
recent incarnation of “fundamentals” (e.g., Morck, et al. (1990), Polk and Sapienza (2004)), 
which consists of parameters that drive two decisions: (1) whether the costs justify the benefits 
of inventory (e.g., financing cost, increased sales) and (2) whether financial constraints (e.g., 
cash flow situation, availability of credit, potential to raise equity; as in Kashyap, et al. (1994)) 
force the inventory decision into a corner solution.  Morck, et al. (1990) find that for the period 
1959-87, “the market may not be a complete sideshow, but nor is it very central.”  This 
somewhat ambiguous conclusion, and the different time period and dependant variable 
(inventory instead of capital expenditures), motivate my study of the other three hypotheses. 
In the second hypothesis, the stock market affects inventory decisions via a financing channel.  
The idea is that if the market is inefficient, firms could time their funding-raising when their 
valuations are overly high.  The higher the valuation of a firm, the lower is its cost of capital 
(e.g., Brainard and Tobin (1968),  Fischer and Merton (1984)).  This lower cost of capital could 
come directly from the lower cost of equity issuance, or indirectly by lower cost of debt with 
expanded debt capacity or reduced overhang.  Lower cost of capital leads to higher inventories.  
A further implication, which I leave for further research, is whether the higher inventory is 
efficient.  This is a source of debate (e.g., Morck, et al. (1990)).  Fischer and Merton (1984)   4
suggest that the higher inventory is inefficient, because the irrationally low cost of capital leads 
firms to invest in marginally negative net present value projects (or hold too much inventory, in 
my case).  However, Blanchard, et al. (1990) argue that higher inventory is neutral, since firms 
would have invested in zero net present value investments, such as liquid financial securities 
However, the world might not be Modigliani-Miller at the margin.  If a firm is financially-
constrained, the overly cheap financing available when it is irrationally over-valued would allow 
it to invest in positive net present value projects that it could not otherwise undertake (e.g., 
Fazzari, et al. (1988), Kaplan and Zingales (1997), and Baker, et al. (2003)). 
The third hypothesis is that during periods of mis-valuation (either over- or under-valuation), 
firms might let inventories rise unnecessarily, dissipating value that might otherwise be captured 
with more efficient operations.  This dissipation could arise because: (1) in the language of 
principal-agent models such as Baker (1992), keeping operations efficient with lower inventory 
requires costly effort that does not translate well into observable characteristics, (2) the 
observable characteristic, valuation, is being driven up or down unrelated to inventory, and (3) 
the principal’s monitoring on efficient inventory levels is reduced, relative to other priorities that 
might drive firm value.  This dissipation hypothesis is empirically indistinguishable from one 
part of the financing hypothesis, where overvaluation leads to easier financing, which in turn 
leads to more inventories.  It is, however, distinguishable from the financing hypothesis in that 
dissipation is predicted to occur in both times of over-valuation and under-valuation, whereas the 
financing hypothesis predicts that inventories will be overly high during over-valuation and 
overly low during under-valuation.  The dissipation hypothesis might seem to be related to the 
free cash-flow hypothesis of Jensen (1986), in which firms left with too much cash dissipate 
them with empire-building.  However, the motivating factor there is that managers consciously 
choose to implement negative net present value projects, rather than not exert costly effort to 
keep inventories optimal.  It is also important to clarify that the dissipation hypothesis does not 
suggest that there is no dissipation without mis-valuation.  Instead, it predicts that dissipation is 
increased with mis-valuation.  Under the dissipation hypothesis, and unlike the first two 
hypotheses, managers of the firms are assumed to have interests that diverge from those of   5
shareholders.  This is also an assumption in the fourth and last hypothesis. 
The fourth hypothesis is that managers cater to the interest of the stock market, even if this 
catering is at the expense of long-term shareholder value.  Managers cater because of short-term 
interests, as pointed out by Stein (1988).  For example, their compensation might be a function of 
short-term stock price.  They might also need to periodically sell off their shares in the firm, so 
they ensure that the firm’s short-term is not undervalued.  Or they might keep the firm’s short-
term value high to avoid being its being taken-over by buyout firms that might fire them.  Or 
they might want to ensure that their reputation and worth in the executive market is high, as in 
the career-concerns models of Narayanan (1985) and Holmstrom (1999).  While the financing 
and dissipation hypotheses depend on stock market mis-valuation in general, the catering 
hypothesis depends on a specific kind of mis-valuation based on inventory.  When there is an 
“inventory discount,” managers cater to the market by reducing their inventories.  Conversely, 
when pthere is an inventory premium, managers increase inventories.  The inventory 
discount/premium might arise because it is difficult to read what high inventory really means 
(e.g., Lai (2005)).  It could mean operational incompetence, but it could also mean good 
prospective sales.  Furthermore, at any one time, the beliefs of investors, especially noisy traders, 
tend to herd (e.g., Scharfstein and Stein (1990)).  Therefore, we might see an inventory discount 
one time and a premium at another.  Aghion and Stein (2005) provide a formal model of how 
something like this can happen. 
The inventory discount/premium is analogous to similar phenomena studied in other areas of 
market inefficiency, such as the small firm premium (Roll (1983)), close-end mutual fund 
premium (Boudreaux (1973), Lee, et al. (1991)), or the dividend discount/premium (e.g., Baker 
and Wurgler (2004)).  The catering hypothesis is also consistent with the signaling hypothesis of 
Lai (2005), which documents an inventory threshold for a separating equilibrium.  In general, 
firms face an inventory discount.  The graph of valuation against inventory level slopes down, 
until inventory (scaled by sales) is above 0.1, when it becomes flat – i.e., inventory becomes a 
noisy signal.  Therefore, to the extent that only competent firms can reduce their inventory levels   6
to below 0.1, there will be a separating equilibrium.
2  Finally, as a concluding clarification: the 
catering hypothesis does not require that firms are smart enough to time the market.  For 
example, managers in firms might simply be forced to cater to the inventory discount. 
1.3.  Empirical Strategy and Data 
The key challenge is identification in the presence of endogeneity, since inventory and the right-
hand-side variables can be simultaneously determined or there might be reverse causality.  I 
address these in this section. 
The data is extracted from COMPUSTAT-CRSP, ExecuComp, I/B/E/S, CDA, The Wall Street 
Journal, and a variety of other sources detailed below.  I updated all COMPUSTAT-CRSP data 
with restated ones – e.g., for sales, assets, cost of goods sold.  To be included in the dataset, I 
follow the practice in the literature (e.g., Morck, et al. (1990), Polk and Sapienza (2004), 
Gompers, et al. (2003), Baker, et al. (2003)): observations cannot be involved in acquisitions or 
mergers, the market-to-book and Q must be between 0.1 and 100, sales, assets, capital 
expenditures, income before earnings and interest, common dividends, common equity must all 
have non-negative values, and outliers are dealt with by winsorizing at the 1% and 99% 
percentiles.  One of the usual problems with using COMPUSTAT-CRSP data is truncation bias, 
because some firms are not documented in the earlier years.  To deal with this, I use a Heckman 
sample selection correction; an example is reported in the test of the “fundamentals only” 
hypothesis below.  The bias (the inverse Mills ratio) is only significant at about 8%, so I do not 
report corrections in the rest of the tables.  A possible reason that the bias is small is that the long 
period of coverage overwhelms the shorter period of truncation.  There is also possible 
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survivorship bias: the dataset might contain surviving firms that are different from those 
dropped.  For this, I create a sub-sample that truncates five years out of the beginning and end of 
my dataset.  Again, the result is qualitatively unchanged so I do not report this to save space. 
1.3.1.  The “Fundamentals Only” Hypothesis 
I estimate the following model with fixed effects: 
INVENTORYt = β0 + β1.OVERVALUATIONt-1 + β2.FUNDAMENTALSt + 
firm effects + year indicators + εt. (1) 
This is essentially differencing the standard Q-theoretic investment equation (e.g., Summers 
(1981)).  OVERVALUATION is lagged while FUNDAMENTALS is contemporaneous because I 
am interested in whether the former affects INVENTORY beyond its ability to predict the latter.  
It is possible, however, that lagging OVERVALUATION might provide FUNDAMENTALS with 
an informational advantage.  However, including contemporaneous measures of 
OVERVALUATION (unreported) do not change the results, a finding consistent with Poterba 
(1990).  The non-fundamental OVERVALUATION channels are considered to be influential if an 
F-test on β1 rejects the null, after partialling out the fundamentals effects. 
In the baseline model, I measure INVENTORY using inventory value.  For robustness, I also 
employ alternatives used in the literature, such as scaling by property, plant, and equipment, 
following Polk and Sapienza (2004), or using the adjusted inventory used in Gaur, et al. (2005).
3 
In the baseline model, I measure OVERVALUATION using abnormal stock returns.  Following 
Morck, et al. (1990), I employ alphas under a CAPM (capital asset pricing model) model, using 
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annual market and risk-free returns from Professor French’s website.
4  Using the CAPM alpha 
has the advantage that it could understate the effect of OVERVALUATION on INVENTORY, 
because if part of the CAPM alpha is really compensation for risks, that part is a fundamental 
parameter (being expected, not abnormal, return) that should not cause any change in 
INVENTORY.  Nevertheless, overvaluation is a potentially contentious issue, so I employ other 
measures to maximize robustness.  I do bear in mind, however, that the literature is still 
ambivalent about the source of sentiment (e.g., whether it reflects changing risk tolerance or 
growth expectations, Baker and Wurgler (2004)), so the object here is to measure sentiment 
rather than to achieve the more ambitious goal of studying it.  First, I use the more recent model 
by Fama and French (1993) for abnormal returns, based on SML (“small minus large”), HML 
(“high book-to-market minus low”), and UMD (“up momentum versus down”) factors, also 
obtained from the same website.  Second, I use the close-end fund discount, which has the well-
known characteristic that stock price often differs from net asset value in such funds, because 
unsophisticated investors hold different beliefs than others.  This difference is generally regarded 
as a measure of market mis-valuation (e.g., Zweig (1973), Long, et al. (1990), Lee, et al. (1991)).  
Following Baker and Wurgler (2004), I obtain the value-weighted closed-end fund discount from 
Neal and Wheatley (1998) (for years 1962 through 1993), CDA (1994 through 1998), and The 
Wall Street Journal end-of-year issues (1999 through 2000).  Third, following Polk and Sapienza 
(2004), I use discretionary accruals.  Sloan (1996) and Teoh, et al. (1998) find that such accruals 
lead to lower stock returns, which can be interpreted as over-valuation.  This argument relies on 
investors not being sophisticated enough to see through the manipulation of accruals, a fact well-
documented by researchers such as Maines and Hand (1996).  Discretionary accruals are 
measured as total accruals less normal accruals, following Jones (1991) and Teoh, et al. (1998).  
Total accruals are defined as: 
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Last accessed July 21, 2005.   9
ACCRi,t = ( ∆[CurrentAssetsi,t + Cashi,t] – ∆[CurrentLiabilitiesi,t – LongTermDebti,t] )  / 
TotalAssetsi,t-1 . 
For each firm, I then derive its non-discretionary accruals by first running a cross-section 
regression using the firm’s four-digit SIC code peers (i.e., all but itself): 
  ACCRi,t = θ0 + θ1.(1/TotalAssets,t-1) + θ2.(∆salesi,t/TotalAssets,t-1) + 
      θ3.(PlantPropertyEqpti,t/ TotalAssets,t-1) + εi,t. 
Using the predicted coefficients  ˆ θ  from the regression, the firm’s non-discretionary accruals are: 
  NONDIS-ACCRi,t =  ˆ θ 0 +  ˆ θ 1.(1/TotalAssets,t-1) + 
     ˆ θ 2.(∆salesi,t – ∆accountsReceivablei,t)/TotalAssets,t-1 + 
     ˆ θ 3.(PlantPropertyEqpti,t/TotalAssets,t-1). 
Discretionary accruals are then defined as the difference between total and non-discretionary 
accruals.  One advantage of using discretionary accruals in this paper is that it could understate 
the effect of OVERVALUATION.  This is because Chan, et al. (2001) documents that firms with 
high discretionary accruals tend to be followed by low cash flows (a fundamental parameter)), so 
that even if accruals might be correlated with FUNDAMENTALS, they are so only negatively. 
The different measures of OVERVALUATION have two important properties.  First, they work 
through different channels in mis-valuation.  For example, the closed-end fund discount operates 
through differences in clientele segments while discretionary accruals work through information 
distortion.  Second, they are all linked to cross-sectional patterns in returns that are not well-
explained by standard asset pricing models. 
I measure FUNDAMENTALS using net sales and cash flow, following Morck, et al. (1990).  The 
first drives how much inventory is needed and the latter, how much a firm can afford.  There are 
other possible drivers, such as the internal cost of capital and ordering costs, and these are 
absorbed into firm and year fixed effects.  The marginal cost of external financing, however, is 
something I will consider explicitly, in the financing hypothesis.  As a robustness check, I also 
measure  FUNDAMENTALS using Q, following Polk and Sapienza (2004).  This has the   10
advantage that Q could capture parts of OVERVALUATION (e.g., Abel and Blanchard (1986)), 
so that the coefficient of OVERVALUATION is likely to understate its importance.  My measure 
of average Q has another well-known theoretical problem, that it is a poor measure of marginal 
Q.  However, this is generally resolved in the literature as not an important measurement 
problem empirically (see, for example, Abel and Blanchard (1986)). 
There are some other empirical issues: 
1.  Estimation method.  One method is to use a fixed effects model.  Another is to undertake 
an OLS (ordinary least squares) estimation using changes in levels, so as to make 
comparisons with Morck, et al. (1990), a major paper in the field.  Like them, I use 
industry dummies and find that the results (unreported) are qualitatively unchanged.   
Furthermore, I use year dummies (reported here), whose inclusion means a more 
stringent test because they understate the effect of OVERVALUATION if they pick up 
time variations of the aggregate stock market.  One issue here is over what horizon 
should the changes be taken.  Morck, et al. (1990) use a three-year period.  This has the 
advantage of letting inventory decisions take their course, although unlike their capital 
expenditure regressions, inventories might be expected to take their course at a quicker 
pace.  The disadvantage is that the longer the horizon, the more susceptible is the 
specification to endogeneity.  For example, in Q-theory, the desired level of capital stock 
might not follow a deterministic trend over longer periods.  In any case, I regress over 
shorter one- and three-year horizons and the results are qualitatively unchanged.  I report 
only the one-year ones.  As clarification, when estimating using fixed effects, the 
variables are at levels; when using OLS, they are changes. 
2.  Discretized dependant variables.  One way to deal with measurement error of 
INVENTORY is to discretize it, using a dummy which is set to 1 if the change in 
inventory exceeds a threshold and 0 otherwise  (e.g., Morck, et al. (1990)).  Importantly, 
this also weakens the contending interpretation that small inventory changes are not the 
result of conscious firm policy, but involuntary changes.   11
3.  Lag structures.  Lags help minimize simultaneity issues.  I use zero to four lags in the 
specifications.  In this paper, I report results from estimations using no lags for OLS 
regressions and two lags for fixed effect regressions; other specifications give 
qualitatively similar results, unless otherwise stated. 
4.  Reversed causality and simultaneity.  Reversed causality is handled by lagging 
OVERVALUATION.  It is still possible that the measures of FUNDAMENTALS such as 
sales and cash flow are simultaneously determined with the stock returns used to measure 
OVERVALUATION.  Suppose a good past return increases inventories because of lower 
costs of financing, but increased inventories improve sales because of better availability.  
Therefore, measuring FUNDAMENTALS with sales would pick up some effect of the 
influence of returns on inventories.  First, this only understates the effect of 
OVERVALUATION.  Second, it turns out that the data does not support this story, as I 
argue below in the “Results” section. 
1.3.2.  The Financing Hypothesis 
I add variables measuring the volume of past equity and debt issuance: 
 INVENTORYt = β0 + β1. FUNDAMENTALSt + β2.OVERVALUATIONt-1 + γ1.EQUITYt-1 +  
   γ2.DEBTt-1 + firm effects + year indicators + εt. (2) 
We should see that the γ coefficients are positively signed and β2
 drops in economic significance.  
I measure EQUITY using two methods, one following Morck, et al. (1990) that divides common 
equity by beginning-of-year market capitalization, and a more sophisticated way by Daniel and 
Titman (2003) that considers equity issuance, employee stock and pension plans, repurchases, 
and dividends.  Specifically, the latter, which I will call DT equity, can be interpreted as the (log 
of the) number of shares one would have at time t for every share one owns at t-τ, had one 
reinvested all cash distributions back into the stock.  It is defined as: 
DT equity = log (Mt/Mt-τ) – r(t-τ,t) . 
Mt is the per share value at t and r(t-τ,t) is the log stock return from t-τ to t, in turn defined as:   12
 r(t-τ,t) = 
1
t
stτ =−+ ∑ log[(Ms.fs + Ds)/Ms-1 ] , 
where fs is the price adjustment factor from s-1 to s that accounts for splits and rights issues, and 
Ds is the per-share cash distribution paid at time s. 
I measure DEBT using book debt.  EQUITY and DEBT are interpreted as specialized measures of 
OVERVALUATION that account for the financial channel which with OVERVALUATION might 
influence INVENTORY.  For example, Daniel and Titman (2003) documents how their measure 
of equity issuance predicts subsequent low stock returns, suggesting current over-valuation. 
Empirically, data on these are often inaccurate (often due to acquisitions), so Morck, et al. (1990) 
suggest using indicator variables, where EQUITY is 1 if the change in equity is over 5% and 
DEBT is 1 if the change in debt is over 10%.  This provides a less stringent test.  As will be seen, 
the financing hypothesis is not well supported, so using this method allows me to see if the 
hypothesis is indeed weak even when given benefit of the doubt. 
The financing hypothesis makes another prediction that I can use as a still more robust test: 
financially-constrained (or small, as a proxy) firms should be even more susceptible to the effect 
of the stock market.  To test this, I augment the specification in (2) to: 
 INVENTORYt = β0 + …as before… + γ1.EQUITYt-1 + γ2.DEBTt-1 + 
   δ1.EQUITYt-1 ¯ FINANCIALLY-CONSTRAINEDt + 
     δ2.DEBTt-1 ¯ FINANCIALLY-CONSTRAINEDt + 
firm effects + year indicators + εt. (3) 
Positively-signed δ coefficients would be consistent with the financing hypothesis. 
A measure of FINANCIALLY-CONSTRAINED would include standard corporate finance 
parameters such as firm size, firm age, leverage, cash balance, cash flow, cash volatility, and 
investment opportunities.  Kaplan and Zingales (1997) incorporate these in an index.  The 
advantage of this KZ index is that it is transparent and, having been built from scratch for a 
different purpose, is unlikely to be biased for my purpose.   13
1.3.3.  The Dissipation Hypothesis 
The dissipation hypothesis predicts a quadratic relationship in OVERVALUATION:   
INVENTORYt = β0 + β1. FUNDAMENTALSt + β2.OVERVALUATIONt-1 + 
β3.OVERVALUATION
2
t-1 + firm effects + year indicators + εt. (4) 
Unlike the financing hypothesis, the dissipation hypothesis is motivated by an agency problem 
between manager and shareholder.  Therefore, it also predicts that in a cross section, firms with 
bigger agency problems have more dissipation.  I test for this by modifying specification (1) as 
follows, where G is a governance index from I/B/E/S calculated by Gompers, et al. (2003): 
INVENTORYt = β0 + β1. FUNDAMENTALSt + β2.OVERVALUATIONt-1 + 
β3.OVERVALUATION
2
t-1 + ζ1 Gt + 
 ζ2.OVERVALUATION
2
t-1¯Gt  + 
firm effects + year indicators + εt. (5) 
A negatively signed ζ2 is consistent with the dissipation hypothesis. 
1.3.4.  The Catering Hypothesis 
The biggest empirical challenge to testing the catering hypothesis is in measuring the inventory 
discount.  I use a number of measures to minimize measurement problems.  Structurally, each 
measure divides the dataset into low- and high-inventory firm-year observations and the 
inventory discount is the difference by some measure (say the mean market-to-book ratio) 
between these two sub-samples.  For the choice of dividing into low- and high-inventory 
observations, I use a variety of criteria: (1) inventory value levels, (2) inventory value changes, 
(3) inventory value divided by property-plant-equipment value, (4) inventory/PPE changes, (5) 
inventory/sales based on the adjusted-inventory-turn specification in Gaur, et al. (2005), and (6) 
inventory/sales changes.  For the choice of measuring the difference between the low- and high-
sub-samples, I use the log of the difference in the market-to-book (MTB) ratios and the future 
one-year, two-year, three-year, and cumulative three-year stock returns (please see Baker and 
Wurgler (2004) for a similar set-up for calculating the dividend premium).  For each of these, I   14
employ still finer variations, using means versus medians, and using equal-weighted versus 
market cap-weighted measures.  The inventory discount is positive when the MTB for low-
inventory firms exceed that for high-inventory firms.  It is negative when measured using future 
returns, since future returns are low when current valuations (MTB) are too high and vice versa.  
We can also think of the difference in future returns as an inventory premium. 
Figure 1 shows two measures of the inventory discount.  It appears the discount is positive for 
most of the late 1970s and the 1980s, turns negative in the 1990s, and begins its journey back to 
neutrality in the early 2000s.  Another striking figure of the picture is that the two measures are 
reassuringly correlated.  Table 1 shows the correlation coefficients among a few of these 
measures.  It also reports Dickey-Fuller tests for unit roots, with and without time trends and 
lags.  These tests are valid because there are theoretical reasons for covariance stationarity.  For 
example, the discount cannot grow indefinitely. 
The catering hypothesis predicts that the coefficient on INVENTORY-DISCOUNT is negative.  It 
also predicts that firms with shorter-term horizons are more sensitive to the discount.  I use six 
pieces of executive-level information from I/B/E/S to consolidate into firm-level information that 
I interpret as shorter-term orientations: (1) more executives granted options or shares
5, (2) greater 
percent of options granted to employees, (3) higher value of unexercised exercisable options held 
by the average executive, (4) higher value realized from options for the average executive, 
exercised at t+1, (5) higher percentage of company stock held by employees, and (6) higher 
value of restricted stock holdings by the average executive.  I then compare the inventory 
discount sensitivity in the top and bottom quartiles ranked by short-termism. 
1.4.  Results 
The summary statistics are in Table 2. 
Table 3 shows the baseline results, in models (1) through (4).  Models (1) and (2) replicate the 
                                                 
5 In I/B/E/S, “executives” mean top management officers as defined by the firm, usually taken to mean vice 
president and above, while “employees” mean all staff, full-time or otherwise.   15
first two models in Morck, et al. (1990).  They are OLS regression on changes.  Apart from the 
dependant variable, one difference is that I use one-year horizons whereas Morck, et al. (1990) 
use three-year horizons, because I expect that inventories, unlike their capital expenditures, are 
adjustable much faster over time
6.  Because of this difference, I have three times more year 
indicators, and therefore expect a much higher R
2.  As a starting point, I note from Model (1) that 
OVERVALUATION is an important driver of inventory decisions, with both a substantial R
2 and 
positive significant sign.  Model (2) partials out the effects of FUNDAMENTALS, and the 
resulting coefficient on OVERVALUATION drops substantially, but is still very significant.  For 
robustness, I undertake similar estimations using other measures of the variables.  For example: 
•  Using a Fama-French alpha rather than the CAPM alpha for OVERVALUATION gives a 
t-statistic of 5.9 for OVERVALUATION even after partialling over FUNDAMENTALS 
•  Using a three-year horizon gives a t-statistic of 1.8. 
•  Using a two-period lag structure gives a t-statistic of  2.5. 
Model (3) continues the robustness check, using fixed effects estimation on inventory scaled by 
property-plant and equipment, and with OVERVALUATION measured by discretionary accruals.  
The fixed effects estimation significantly reduces the R
2, but OVERVALUATION is once again 
significantly positive.  The low R
2 may be an artifact of measurement error in discretionary 
accruals, so Model (4) uses a more established measure of sentiment, the closed-end fund 
discount.  The R
2 is significant, and OVERVALUATION is once again significant and positive.  
In Model (5), I use all the measures as instrument variables for the Fama-French alpha measure, 
in a two-stage least squares estimation.  The result is qualitatively unchanged. 
Model (6) shows the result of a logistic regression using a discrete version of INVENTORY, in 
which the dummy is 1 if ∆inventory is more than 1.2 and 0 otherwise.  The results are qualitative 
unchanged, as are those (unreported) using different thresholds for creating the dummy variable. 
                                                 
6 These estimations are done with heteroskedastic-robust standard errors and clustered around firms to minimize 
serial correlation, although it is unclear whether Morck, et al. (1990) do the same.   16
Model (7) shows a Heckman correction for possible truncation bias, because the dataset appears 
to be more complete for later years.  The first-stage correction model is: 
SELECTED = f (MKTCAP, S&P500, ASSETS) , 
where MKTCAP is market capitalization, S&P500 is whether the firm is ever in the S&P 500, 
and ASSETS is total assets.  The results are qualitatively the same, and the inverse Mill’s ratio is 
marginally significant at 7.9%.  To simplify the exposition here, I present results without the 
Heckman correction, after checking that the corrected results are qualitatively unchanged. 
One concern I explain earlier is the possibility of simultaneity, in that INVENTORY might 
influence sales, which in turn influence the stock market.  This seems unlikely from model (2), 
which shows that doubling sales would increase inventory by 49.3%.  The mean sales-to-
inventory ratio is 27.7 and the median is even lower, at 6.6.  Therefore, most of the sales increase 
does not come from inventory increase. 
The economic significance varies.  In the closed-end fund discount measure of 
OVERVALUATION, a one standard deviation change in OVERVALUATION leads to a 10% 
standard deviation change in INVENTORY, while the CAPM alpha measure produces only a 2% 
standard deviation change in INVENTORY.   This compares well with the economic significance 
of the FUNDAMENTALS measured.  A standard deviation change in cash flow growth correlates 
with a 28% standard deviation change in INVENTORY.  For sales growth, it is 43% and for 
lagged Q, it is 6%.  Overall, it is significant that market sentiment, OVERVALUATION, 
contributes changes to INVENTORY on the same order of magnitude as FUNDAMENTALS. 
Table 4 shows the test for the financing hypothesis.  Model (1) is a baseline to follow the 
specification in Morck, et al. (1990).  All the coefficients are positively signed as predicted, and 
are significant.  Firms that issue 1% more new debt show 3.3% to 6.6% more inventory growth, 
on average and controlling for fundamentals.  This is higher but of the same order of magnitude 
as the 1.75% Morck, et al. (1990) obtain for growth in capital expenditures.  Similarly, firms that 
increase their shares by 1% show 2.5% to 3.4% more inventory growth.  Again, this is 
comparable to the 1.6% obtained by Morck, et al. (1990).  Comparing this model (1) with model   17
(1) in Table 3, we can see that FINANCING reduces the impact of OVERVALUATION, although 
the latter is still significant.  I interpret this as weak support for the financing hypothesis.  Model 
(2) shows the same, using discretized versions of ∆debt and ∆equity following Morck, et al. 
(1990), in which they set the debt dummy to 1 if the change is more than 20% and the equity 
dummy to 1 if more than 10%.  The results are qualitatively unchanged. 
Model (3) shows the delineation of the financing effect by the degree of financial constraint.  As 
expected, constrained firms (high KZ index) have lower inventory levels.  More interesting, the 
interaction of the financing channel in overvaluation (as measured by changes in debt and equity 
issues, after partialling out FUNDAMENTALS) with the KZ index is positive and significant.  
This again supports the financing hypothesis: the more constrained a firm, the more it leverages 
misevaluation to obtain easier financing for inventory.  Unreported robustness checks with other 
measures of OVERVALUATION such as Fama-French alphas and accruals produce the same 
result, although the effect of FINANCIALLY-CONSTRAINED is much reduced with accruals.  I 
interpret this as accruals picking up financial-constraints, so using accruals is less interesting as a 
measure of OVERVALUATION here. 
Model (4) uses the closed-end fund discount as a measure of OVERVALUATION and DT equity.  
It produces negative coefficients for the FINANCING variables.  These are the opposite of what 
is predicted, although their low economic significance (e.g., one standard deviation change in DT 
equity produces only 0.6% standard deviation change in INVENTORY) might best be interpreted 
as negligible impact.  When I regress using interactions with the KZ index in Model (5), I obtain 
the predicted positive signs on the interaction terms.  The economic significance is low. 
It is possible that firms have different financing technologies.  For example, if INVENTORY is 
concave in EQUITY or DEBT, and financially-constrained firms tend to also have low EQUITY 
or DEBT, then I would observe that these firms have a higher inventory sensitivity to finance.  
To take care of this, I use quadratic formulations of EQUITY and DEBT, and it turns out (in 
unreported regressions) that this is not a concern.  Overall, I conclude that I cannot reject the 
financing hypothesis, although the evidence for it is rather weak.   18
In Table 5, I report the results of testing the dissipation hypothesis.  In Model (1), I report a 
predicted quadratic relationship between INVENTORY  and  OVERVALUATION, which is 
statistically and economically significant.  In Model (2), I conduct a further test to see if the 
quadratic relationship is ameliorated with stronger governance.  Unfortunately, the small number 
of observations with a G index does not produce a statistically valid estimation.  Nevertheless, 
the G index is negatively signed and significant, consistent with the view that stronger 
governance reduces inventory, controlling for other effects.  In Model 3, I estimate with a fixed-
effects specification using the closed-end fund discount measure of OVERVALUATION.  The 
dissipation effect is not evident, as the only significant coefficient on OVERVALUATION is on 
the linear term.  Model (4) attempts to use the G index, and again, due to the small sample size, I 
could not arrive at a reasonable estimation.  Overall, it appears that the dissipation effect is only 
very weakly supported, if at all. 
In Table 6, I report the test for the catering hypothesis.  Panel (a) shows the influence of 
INVENTORY-DISCOUNT and panel (b) shows how this influence is different for firms with 
more short-term orientation (S) versus others (L, for long-term orientation), measured in various 
ways.  In panel (a), the first five models are estimated using inventory growth as the measure of 
INVENTORY and five different measures of INVENTORY-DISCOUNT (other measures 
described earlier are unreported but achieve the same qualitative result).  As predicted, the 
measures using differences in future returns (which can be thought of as inventory premium) are 
positively signed, while the last using the difference in market-to-book between high- and low-
inventory firms shows the predicted negative sign.  All coefficients are significant.  For 
robustness, I show the next five models based on inventory/PPE as a measure of INVENTORY.  
The result is qualitatively similar.  Panel (b) shows just the coefficients for INVENTORY-
DISCOUNT, from estimations done with specifications like those of models (9) and (10) in panel 
(a).  Each of the six sub-panels is for some measure of short-term orientation of the management.  
For example, sub-panel (1) classifies firm-years by the number of executives in that firm-year 
that hold options on the firm’s stock.  The top quartile of these firm-years is considered short-
term and the bottom quartile long-term.  As predicted, coefficients on INVENTORY-DISCOUNT   19
is almost always more sensitive for short-term oriented firm-years, while they are mostly lower 
or statistically indistinguishable from zero for long-term oriented firm-years. 
In table 7, I report results with all hypotheses together.   The financing hypothesis seems to have 
the most economic significance in model (1), but its reversal of signs in model (2) makes me 
worry about concluding that it is the most important.  The dissipation hypothesis lack statistical 
significance in both models.  The catering hypothesis seems to be more robust, even if its 
economic significance is only roughly half that of the financing hypothesis. 
Given the preponderance of evidence consistent with the catering hypothesis, it appears the 
hardest to reject among all the ones tested. 
1.5.  Alternative Interpretations 
The weight of the evidence appears to support the view that the stock market does influence 
inventory decisions.  Among the channels with which the market could affect these decisions, the 
catering hypothesis seems to be the one most favored by the data.  I cannot reject the financing 
and dissipation hypotheses, but the evidence seems comparatively weak. 
Might there be alternative interpretations of the same data?  First, I emphasize that the financing, 
dissipation, and catering hypotheses are neither exhaustive nor exclusive.  For example, Morck, 
et al. (1990) describe another hypothesis, that the stock market impacts capital expenditures via 
an information channel.  Under this hypothesis, the stock market affects expenditures because it 
provides investment information useful to firms.  However, even Morck, et al. (1990) dismiss 
this hypothesis as a lame strawman that does not need testing, because it is difficult to imagine 
that the stock market has better information than insiders in firms do. 
Another alternative interpretation that is also easily ruled out is that the catering hypothesis could 
arise from a rational clientele effect, as is the case argued by Black and Scholes (1974) for 
dividend clienteles, rather than inefficient markets.  Since clientele effects rely on differences in 
investor preferences that come from tax effects, transaction costs, or institutional investment 
constraints, it is hard to see how any of these could be applicable to the inventory discount. 
A more intriguing critique of the set of hypotheses is that it could be that markets are efficient   20
and it is firms and managers who are irrational.  Originally developed by Roll (1986) in the 
context of takeovers, the idea is that managers, even if acting in the interest of shareholders, 
genuinely believe (inaccurately) that their firms are undervalued.  Such overconfident managers 
might load up on too much inventory (thinking that sales will come) or too little (thinking that 
they can handle the same amount of sales with less inventory).  I do not test this hypothesis for 
several reasons.  First, managers’ overconfidence is much less observable (but see Malmeindier 
and Tate (2002)).  Second, while the psychological basis of some aspects of investor sentiment 
(e.g., herding) has time variations and is widely documented (e.g., Baker, et al. (2004), Barberis, 
et al. (1998)), it is harder to think of the psychological basis of overconfidence having the same 
time variation.  Third, the investor sentiment paradigm is comparatively more studied and 
accepted.  Finally, the overconfidence interpretation and the market inefficiency interpretation 
can be discriminated by examining the impact of future returns.  If markets were efficient and 
managers overconfident, future returns would not be especially low because of current over-
valuation.  In the results section, I report tests that use future returns as measures of 
OVERVALUATION.  The result is consistent only with a market inefficiency paradigm.   
Nevertheless, it is possible that both the overconfidence and market inefficiency paradigms 
simultaneously hold, and this is a promising avenue for future research. 
Finally, I have to consider if changes in inventory, unlike changes in capital expenditures studied 
in macroeconomics and finance, might actually not be the result of policy decisions by firms.  
Instead, they could be involuntary changes that are outcomes of changes to say, sales prospects.  
What this means is that the relationship between dependant and independent variables might be 
hardwired.  Two arguments count against this interpretation.  First, I measure inventory changes 
at yearly frequencies.  While it is plausible, even likely, that inventory changes might not be 
policy decisions at shorter frequencies, it is much harder to say that firms do not review their 
inventory levels at yearly intervals when, for example, they and their auditors review financial 
statements.  Even no action could be viewed as a policy decision at these times.  The second 
counter-argument is that in the data, the volatility of inventory is high.  For example, a ratio of 
standard deviation to mean can be computed for inventory change for each firm.  This ratio has a   21
mean of 34%.  Similarly, a ratio of standard deviation to mean can be computed for 
inventory/PPE.  This has a mean of 51%.  Such high ratios suggest that it is unlikely that firms 
do not have an active hand in their inventory policy. 
1.6.  Conclusion 
I find that the stock market does influence inventory decisions and provide evidence that this 
influence is likely to have taken effect via a catering channel, and perhaps also by financing and 
dissipation channels.  The theoretical implication is that inventory models might have been more 
accurate taking into account such empirical parameters (e.g., Netessine and Roumiantsev 
(2005)).  The practical implication is that inventory levels might have been optimized with a 
short-term view, rather than for the long-term interest of the firm.  One nature line of future work 
is to further confirm this empirically, for example, by investigating long-term returns within a 
Fama and Macbeth (1973) framework.  Another line of future research is to investigate the 
source of mis-valuation in general, and the inventory discount in particular.  For example, it is 
possible that investors sometimes treat high inventory as a signal of operational incompetence 
but at other times, treat high inventory as a signal of expected growth.  In a broader sense, it 
might be profitable to investigate more closely the interface between finance and operations 
management. 
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Figure 1 – The Inventory Discount. 
The vertical axis is a normalized scale obtained by subtracting the raw discount by the mean over the entire time 
series, and dividing that by the standard deviation of the time series.  The lighter line is the discount calculated as the 
difference in mean market-to-book value between the lowest- and highest-inventory quartiles classified by inventory 
value.  The darker line shows the negative of the discount calculated as the mean future three-year stock return of 
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Table 1 – Statistics for Some Measures of Inventory Discount 
The measures of inventory discount are based on the difference in the second column (e.g., future return at time t+3, 
or market to book, MTB) of the low vs. high quartiles of firm-year observations, sorted by the criteria in the third 
column.  The data is from COMPUSTAT-CRSP. 
     Dickey-Fuller  test 
of unit roots  Correlation coefficients 





trend  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(1) Returnt+3 Inventory  -3.12 
(.025) 
-2.58 
(.289)  1.00      
  
(2) Returnt+2 Inventory  -3.20 
(.020) 
-1.57 




Inventory   -0.56 
(.880) 
-2.60 
(.279)  0.81 0.76 1.00    
  














(.244)  0.23 0.33 0.32 0.45 1.00 
  
(6) MTB  Inventory  -1.43 
(.565) 
 -2.45 
(.356)  -0.64 -0.66 -0.72 -0.15 -0.38 1.00   
(7) MTB  ∆inventory -2.13 
(.234) 
-2.47 
(.341)  -0.15 -0.30 -0.28 -0.15 -0.29 0.59  1.00 
 
Table 2 - Summary Statistics 
The data is from COMPUSTAT-CRSP, I/B/E/S, and ExecuComp, winsorized at 1% and 99%.  Observations cannot 
be involved in acquisitions or mergers, the market-to-book and Q must be between 0.1 and 100, sales, assets, capital 
expenditures, income before earnings and interest, common dividends, common equity must all be non-negative. 
  N  Mean SD  Min. Max 
Year 97,934  1989.7  8.5  1962  2003 
Market cap  97,922  885.8 6,629.9  0.0 508,329 
Book equity  97,811  406.1 2,388.1  -4,174.0  186,066 
Market-to-book ratio  97,922 3.0  5.9  0.0  99.4 
Return (%)  71,061  3.2 29.1  0.0  4,474.1 
∆cash flow  97,922  4.4 5.9 -12.2  12.9 
∆sales 97,922  1.7  1.1  0.2  3.3 
∆inventory 97,922  2.1 1.2  0.0  3.4 
Alpha CAPM  71,061  1.8 29.0 -2.4  4,471.8 
Alpha Fama French  71,061 1.7  29.0  -4.6  4,469.3 
Inventoryt / PPEt-1 97,922  8.7  10.9  0.0  24.1 
Discretionary accruals  4,514  -40.5 2,807.4  -188,518 5,081 
∆debt 97,934  3.7  4.2  -1.0  8.6 
∆equity 97,934  1.2  1.8  -0.8  4.0 
KZ index  97,934  -1.3  15.7  -137.4  6.3 
Q 97,922  1.7  2.3  0.0  85.4 
G index  3,435  8.8 2.8  1.0  17.0 
Restricted stock holdings by average 
executive ($) 
8,913 411.3  7,434.3 0.0  655,968 
Unexercised exercisable options held 
by average executive ($) 
8,913 2,113.0  9,078.4 -21.7  556,283 
$ realized from options for average 
executive, exercised  
8,913  623.6 2,891.3  -7.1 121,427 
% company stock held by employees  5,520  5.6  8.6  0.0  64.2 
% options granted to employees 10,011  19.5  20.7  0.0  342.5 
Number of executives granted options 
or shares 
10,011 5.5  2.0  1.0  12.0   27
Table 3 – Testing the “Fundamentals Only” Hypothesis 
INVENTORY, OVERVALUATION, and FUNDAMENTALS are measured using a variety of variables in the models 
below.  The specification is of the form: 
INVENTORYt = β0 + β1.OVERVALUATIONt-1 + β2.FUNDAMENTALSt + firm effects + year indicators + εt. 
Models (1) and (2) use OLS on changes, (3) and (4) use firm fixed effects, (5) uses two-stage least squares with 
instrumental variables, (6) logistic, and (7) a Heckman correction.  Accruals are discretionary ones, obtained by 
subtracting from total accruals the discretionary portion.  Totals are: 
ACCRi,t = ( ∆[CurrentAssetsi,t + Cashi,t] – ∆[CurrentLiabilitiesi,t – LongTermDebti,t] )  / TotalAssetsi,t-1 . 
The discretionary portion is: 
NONDIS-ACCRi,t =  ˆ θ 0 +  ˆ θ 1.(1/TotalAssets,t-1) +  ˆ θ 2.(∆salesi,t – ∆accountsReceivablei,t)/TotalAssets,t-1 + 
     ˆ θ 3.(PlantPropertyEqpti,t/TotalAssets,t-1) , 
where the  ˆ θ ’s are obtained from firm-by-firm regressions using all four-digit SIC code peers (i.e., all but itself): 
ACCRi,t = θ0 + θ1.(1/TotalAssets,t-1) + θ2.(∆salesi,t/TotalAssets,t-1) + θ3.(PlantPropertyEqpti,t/ TotalAssets,t-1) + εi,t. 
Most data is from COMPUSTAT-CRSP and I/B/E/S, winsorized at 1% and 99%.  The closed-end fund discount is 
from Neal and Wheatley (1998) (for years 1962 through 1993), CDA (1994 through 1998), and The Wall Street 
Journal end-of-year issues (1999 through 2000).  Fama-French factors are SML, HML, and MOM, from Professor 
French’s website.  The Heckman correction in model (7) uses the following selection model: 
SELECTED = f (MKTCAP, S&P500, ASSETS) , 
where MKTCAP is market capitalization, S&P500 is whether the firm is ever in the S&P 500, and ASSETS is total 
assets.  Observations cannot be involved in acquisitions or mergers, the market-to-book and Q must be between 0.1 
and 100, sales, assets, capital expenditures, income before earnings and interest, common dividends, common equity 
must all have non-negative values.  Estimations are done with heteroskedastic-robust standard errors (in brackets 



















OVERVALUATION              








Accrualst-1    .018 
(.006) 
      
Closed-end fund 
discountt-1 
     .012 
(.002) 




using all three 
above 
       .0013 
(.0004) 
  
FUNDAMENTALS            
∆Cash flow   .058 
(.002) 






∆Sales   .493 
(.010) 










   
              
Inverse Mill’s ratio              -.543 
(.309) 
Firm fixed effects      Yes  Yes       
Year indicators  Yes  Yes      Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2  .245 .513  .003  .126 .082  .294  41257 
(Wald) 
N  97,922 97,922  71,391  66,203 66,203  95,326  97,922 
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Table 4 – Testing the Financing Hypothesis 
Models (1) through (3) use OLS on changes and (4) and (5), firm fixed effects.  The data is from COMPUSTAT-
CRSP and I/B/E/S, winsorized at 1% and 99%.  The closed-end fund discount is from Neal and Wheatley (1998) 
(1962 through 1993), CDA (1994 through 1998), and The Wall Street Journal (1999 through 2000).  The discretized 
versions of ∆debt is set to 1 if ∆debt is more than 20%; likewise for equity if more than 10%.  The measure of DT 
equity is  log (Mt/Mt-τ) – r(t-τ,t) , where Mt is the per share value at t and r(t-τ,t) is the log stock return from t-τ to t, in 
turn defined as r(t-τ,t) = 
1
t
stτ =−+ ∑ log[(Ms.fs + Ds)/Ms-1 ] , where fs is the price adjustment factor from s-1 to s that 
accounts for splits and rights issues, and Ds is the per-share cash distribution paid at time s.  The KZ index is -
1.001909*[(Income before extraordinary items + Depreciation & amortization)/PPE] + 0.2826389*[(Assets + 
Market capitalization – Common equity – Deferred taxes) / Assets] + 3.139193*[(Long-term debt + Debt in current 
liabilities) / (Long-term debt + Debt in current liabilities + Stockholders’ equity)] -39.3678*[(Common dividends + 
Preferred dividends) / PPE]-1.314759*[Cash & short-term investments / PPE].  Observations cannot be involved in 
acquisitions or mergers, the market-to-book and Q must be between 0.1 and 100, sales, assets, capital expenditures, 
income before earnings and interest, common dividends, common equity must be non-negative.  Estimations are 
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FUNDAMENTALS          





























∆debt dummy    .417 
(.014) 
    
∆equity dummy    .018 
(.008) 
    












∆debt ¯ KZ index      .011 
(.001) 
  
∆equity ¯ KZ index      .022 
(.001) 
  








Firm fixed effects        Yes  Yes 
Year indicators  Yes  Yes  Yes     
R
2  .542 .534  .559 .135  .213 
N  97,922 97,922  97,922 66,203  66,203   29
Table 5 – Testing the Dissipation Hypothesis 
The specification for models (1) and (3) is: 
INVENTORYt = β0 + β1. FUNDAMENTALSt + β2.OVERVALUATIONt-1 +β3.OVERVALUATION
2
t-1 + εt. 
That for models (2) and (4) is: 
INVENTORYt = β0 + β1. FUNDAMENTALSt + β2.OVERVALUATIONt-1 + 
β3.OVERVALUATION
2
t-1 + ζ1 Gt +ζ2.OVERVALUATION
2
t-1¯Gt  + εt. 
Models (1) and (2) use OLS on changes and (3) and (5), firm fixed effects.  Most data is from COMPUSTAT-CRSP 
and I/B/E/S, winsorized at 1% and 99%.  The closed-end fund discount is from Neal and Wheatley (1998) (for years 
1962 through 1993), CDA (1994 through 1998), and The Wall Street Journal end-of-year issues (1999 through 
2000).  The governance index G is from Gompers, et al. (2003), obtained from I/B/E/S.  Observations cannot be 
involved in acquisitions or mergers, the market-to-book and Q must be between 0.1 and 100, sales, assets, capital 
expenditures, income before earnings and interest, common dividends, common equity must all have non-negative 
values.  Estimations are done with heteroskedastic-robust standard errors (in brackets below) and clustered around 












OVERVALUATION      






















FUNDAMENTALS      














GOVERNANCE      















Firm fixed effects      Yes  Yes 
Year indicators  Yes  Yes     
R
2  .515 .584 .128 .038 
N  97,922 3,435   66,203 1,920 
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Table 6 – Testing the Catering Hypothesis 
Panel (a) shows a regression of INVENTORY on various measures of OVERVALUATION, FUNDAMENTALS, and INVENTORY-DISCOUNT.  The measures of 
inventory discount are based on the difference (such as the future return at time t+3 or market to book, MTB) of the low vs. high quartiles of firm-year 
observations, sorted by certain criteria (such as inventory, or ∆inventory/PPE).  Panel (b) shows just the coefficients for INVENTORY-DISCOUNT, from 
estimations done with specifications like those of models (9) and (10) in panel (a).  Each of the six sub-panels is for some measure of short-term orientation of 
the management.  For example, sub-panel (1) classifies firm-years by the number of executives in that firm-year that hold options on the firm’s stock.  The top 
quartile of these firm-years is considered short-term and the bottom quartile long-term.  Most data is from COMPUSTAT-CRSP and I/B/E/S, winsorized at 1% 
and 99%.  The closed-end fund discount is from Neal and Wheatley (1998) (for years 1962 through 1993), CDA (1994 through 1998), and The Wall Street 
Journal end-of-year issues (1999 through 2000).  Fama-French factors are SML, HML, and MOM, from Professor French’s website.  The Heckman correction in 
model (7) uses the following selection model: 
SELECTED = f (MKTCAP, S&P500, ASSETS) , 
where MKTCAP is market capitalization, S&P500 is whether the firm is ever in the S&P 500, and ASSETS is total assets.  Observations cannot be involved in 
acquisitions or mergers, the market-to-book and Q must be between 0.1 and 100, sales, assets, capital expenditures, income before earnings and interest, common 
dividends, common equity must all have non-negative values.  Estimations are done with heteroskedastic-robust standard errors (in brackets below) and clustered 
around firms to minimize serial correlation. 
Panel (a) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
INVENTORY  ∆inventory Inventory/PPE 
OVERVALUATION            
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INVENTORY-DISCOUNT  based  on            
•  t+3 return differences of by inventory quartiles  .045 
(.012) 
     .118 
(.031) 
    
•  t+2 return differences of by inventory quartiles   .072 
(.013) 
     .232 
(.030) 
   
•  t+1 to t+3 return differences of by inventory 
quartiles 
   .034 
(.006) 
     .136 
(.015) 
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•  t+1 to t+3 return differences of ∆inventory/PPE 
quartiles 
    .024 
(.006) 
     .060 
(.012) 
 
•  MTB differences of inventory quartiles       -.192 
(.014) 
     -.094 
(.029) 
            
Firm  fixed  effects        Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year  indicators  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes           
R
2  .507 .507 .507 .502 .513 .128 .131 .131 .154 .126 





Number of executives granted options 
or shares 
(2) 
% options granted to 
employees 
(3) 
Unexercised exercisable options held by 
average executive ($) 
Orientation  Short Long Short Long  Short Long Short Long  Short  Long  Short  Long 
INVENTORY-DISCOUNT based 
on 
                    
•  t+1 to t+3 return differences of 
∆inventory/PPE quartiles 






























$ realized from options for average executive, 
exercised at t+1 
(5) 
% Company stock held by 
employees 
(6) 
Restricted stock holdings by average 
executive ($) 
Orientation  Short Long Short Long  Short  Long  Short  Long  Short Long Short Long 
INVENTORY-DISCOUNT based 
on 
                    
•  t+1 to t+3 return differences of 
∆inventory/PPE quartiles 
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Table 7 – Comparison of All Hypotheses 
The cells show the percent change in the standard deviation of INVENTORY for one standard deviation 
change in the explanatory variable, where the specification is: 
INVENTORYt = β0 + β1. FUNDAMENTALSt + γ1.EQUITYt-1 + γ2.DEBTt-1 + β2.OVERVALUATIONt-1 + 
β3.OVERVALUATION
2
t-1 + ζ1 Gt +ζ2.OVERVALUATION
2
t-1¯Gt  + η.INVENTORY-DISCOUNTt + εt. 
Model (1) uses OLS on changes and (2), firm fixed effects.  Most data is from COMPUSTAT-CRSP, 
I/B/E/S, and ExecuComp, winsorized at 1% and 99%.  The measure of DT equity is  log (Mt/Mt-τ) – r(t-τ,t) , 




stτ =−+ ∑ log[(Ms.fs + Ds)/Ms-1 ] , where fs is the price adjustment factor from s-1 to s that accounts for splits 
and rights issues, and Ds is the per-share cash distribution paid at time s.  The governance index G is from 
Gompers, et al. (2003), obtained from I/B/E/S.  Observations cannot be involved in acquisitions or mergers, 
the market-to-book and Q must be between 0.1 and 100, sales, assets, capital expenditures, income before 
earnings and interest, common dividends, common equity must all have non-negative values.  Estimations 









FINANCING    
•  ∆debt  .104***  
•  ∆equity  .084*  
• Debt   -.043 
•  Daniel-Titman (DT) equity   -.016 
DISSIPATION    
• G  index  ¯OVERVALUATION  -.796 -.147 
• G  index  ¯OVERVALUATION
2  -.770 -.128 
CATERING – inventory discount based on:    
•  t+1 to t+3 return differences of low vs. 
high inventory quartiles 
.045***  
•  t+1 to t+3 return differences of low vs. 
high ∆inventory/PPE quartiles 
 .018 
Firm fixed effects    Yes 
Year indicators  Yes   
R
2  .636 .0085 
N  2,550 1,920 
 
 